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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 12-1245 
__________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS PARKER, 
a/k/a Seagull 
 
 
THOMAS PARKER,  
                          Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Criminal No. 4-06-cr-00175-008) 
District Judge:  The Honorable Christopher C. Conner 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 December 10, 2012 
 
BEFORE:  GREENAWAY, Jr., NYGAARD, and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
 
(Filed: January 11, 2013) 
 
__________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge 
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 Thomas Parker appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to reduce his 
sentence.  Counsel for Parker has moved to withdraw and filed an Anders brief, asserting 
that there are no non-frivolous issues for appeal.  Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 
(1967).  We will affirm the District Court’s order and grant counsel’s motion to 
withdraw. 
 Parker pleaded guilty to one count of distributing and possessing with intent to 
distribute in excess of 50 grams of cocaine base, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
841(b)(1)(B)(iii).  The plea agreement stated, in a general manner, that the United States 
Sentencing Guidelines apply, and that giving substantial assistance to the Government 
and accepting responsibility could result in offense-level reductions.  It did not, however, 
provide any details on how the sentence would be calculated.  The agreement required 
Parker to promptly raise any objections to the presentence report, and this specifically 
included any issues with sentencing classifications.   
 The presentence report gave Parker a base offense level of 34 under United States 
Sentencing Guidelines Section 2D1.1(c)(3).  He received a three-level reduction for 
accepting responsibility.  Parker had 22 criminal history points, giving him a criminal 
history category of VI.  The presentence report also classified him as a career offender 
under section 4B1.1 because he was 33 years old, had committed a drug felony, and had 
two prior felonies.  This, too, gave Parker a base offense level of 34.  The resulting 
sentencing range was 188 to 235 months.   
 The presentence report explicitly noted that, in the absence of a plea agreement, a 
conviction on all counts in Parker’s indictment would have resulted in a maximum 
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sentence of life.  Moreover, the report stated that, under the career offender provision of 
the Guidelines, his base level offense would have been 37 and, with a criminal history 
category of VI, his sentencing range would have been 360 months to life.    
 Parker did not file any objections, nor did he raise any at the sentencing hearing.  
The District Court sentenced Parker to 188 months of imprisonment.  The District Court 
did not explicitly state whether it was deriving Parker’s base offense level from section 
2D1.1 of the Guidelines, or from the career offender provision.  The District Court 
merely stated that it was adopting the presentence report without change.   
 Post-sentencing, Parker filed a motion to modify his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 
3582(c)(2), in accord with Amendment 706 that lowered base offense levels for crack 
cocaine offenses.  He argued that, under the retroactive amendment to the Guidelines, his 
base offense level would be 32, with an additional three-level reduction for accepting 
responsibility.
1
  The District Court denied the motion, ruling that it sentenced Parker as a 
career criminal and did not base the sentence on section 2D1.1.   
 Under Anders v. California, counsel can ask to withdraw from representing an 
indigent criminal defendant on appeal if there are no non-frivolous issues to appeal.  We 
exercise plenary review.  When counsel files a motion under Anders, we must determine 
first, whether counsel fulfilled Third Circuit LAR 109.2(a)’s requirements; and second, 
whether our independent review reveals any non-frivolous issues.   
                                              
1
 He also argued in a footnote that, in light of the November 1, 2011 retroactive 
amendments to section 2D1.1 (Amendment 750), his base offense level should be 
reduced to 28, with an additional three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.   
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 We judge counsel’s brief to be adequate.  He raises the proper standard of review 
and he identifies and analyzes the only appealable issue in this case.   
 The District Court did not explicitly state that it was calculating the sentence based 
on the career offender provision of the Guidelines.  Yet, Parker cannot produce any 
evidence that the District Court explicitly derived the base offense level from section 
2D1.1.  Moreover, the District Court denied Parker’s motion because:  the presentence 
report classified him as a career offender; the report referenced the career offender 
sentence range that could have applied in the absence of a plea agreement without even 
mentioning the sentence that could be imposed under 2D1.1; the District Court accepted 
the presentence report without change; and Parker did not object to the report or the 
career offender classification.  We conclude that it did not err by deciding that Parker was 
sentenced as a career offender.  As such, Parker has no basis to argue under the 
Amendments to the Guidelines that his sentence should be reduced.  We also note that his 
sentence is at the bottom of the Guidelines range.   
 For these reasons, we agree with counsel that there are no non-frivolous issues for 
appeal in this case.  Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order denying 
Parker’s motion for a reduction of his sentence and grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. 
Counsel is also relieved of any obligation to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the 
United States Supreme Court.  See Third Circuit LAR 109.2(b). 
